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Subjects in China, Japan, and the United States reported probability judg- 
ments. In Study 1, Chinese and American subjects indicated degrees of cer- 
tainty about their answers to general-knowledge questions with discrete alter- 
natives, e.g., whether potatoes grow better in warm or in cool climates. In 
Study 2, Japanese subjects made similar discrete-alternative assessments. In 
Study 3, subjects in China and the United States reported probability distri- 
bution judgments for various quantities, e.g., the maximum temperature on a 
specified day. Judgment accuracy was evaluated overall and with respect to 
several underlying accuracy dimensions. The overall quality of discrete- 
alternative judgments was indistinguishable among the subjects from the three 
countries. The accuracy component patterns of the Japanese and American 
subjects were essentially the same. However, the Chinese subjects achieved 
the common overall accuracy level very differently. On some accuracy dimen- 
sions, e.g., calibration, the American and Japanese subjects’ judgments were 
superior. On others, e.g., discrimination, the assessments of the Chinese sub- 
jects excelled. Results for quantity judgments were similar to those for dis- 
Crete-alternative judgments, although there were notable differences. Potential 
explanations and implications are discussed. 8 1x39 Academic RCSS, I~C. 
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The present article is about likelihood judgment accuracy. From a prac- 
tical standpoint, this issue is important because decisions can be no better 
than the accuracy of the judgments on which they rest. If an individual’s 
decisions tend to turn out poorly, the quality of the judgments supporting 
those decisions is a plausible potential culprit. Simply discovering 
whether poor judgment is the cause of bad decisions is useful in itself. But 
the accuracy issue is significant theoretically, too. Suppose we seek to 
understand how likelihood judgments are formed. Indications of how ac- 
curacy responds to experimental manipulations provide a window on the 
underlying mechanisms. 
Probability judgments are only one of several commonly used forms of 
likelihood judgment. However, they are attractive for many reasons. One 
advantage is that they permit explicit and careful tradeoffs between the 
certainty of events and the seriousness of their consequences, e.g., in 
expected utility computations in modern technologies such as decision 
analysis (cf. Raiffa, 1968; von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986; Winkler, 
1972). They are also appealing because their precision facilitates the study 
of likelihood judgment quality. 
Calibration is the aspect of probability judgment accuracy that has 
received more attention than any other (cf. Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, 62 
Phillips, 1982). Probability judgments are “well-calibrated” to the extent 
that the judgments attached to various events match the relative frequen- 
cies with which those events actually occur. Consider 1,000 days, on each 
of which a weather forecaster says that there is a 70% chance of ,rain. 
Then, if that forecaster’s judgments are perfectly calibrated, rain will be 
observed on exactly 700 of those days. 
General-knowledge questions are a popular tool for studying calibra- 
tion. Typically, the subject is asked to pick one of two alternatives, and 
then to report a probability judgment that he or she has selected the 
correct answer. An example of such items, sometimes called “almanac 
questions,” is the following: 
Which is farther north? (Check one): 
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- (a) London 
(b) New York. 
Circle the probability that most closely describes how certain you are 
that your chosen alternative is indeed correct: 
50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%. 
A robust finding in almanac question studies is that people’s judgments 
are miscalibrated in a specific way: they tend to be too high. For instance, 
on average, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff s (1977) subjects indicated 72.4% 
certainty in the correctness of their answers to a series of general- 
knowledge questions. However, only 63.8% of those answers were actu- 
ally correct. This phenomenon is often interpreted as “overconfidence” 
(e.g., Fischhoff & MacGregor, 1982). This is not unreasonable, since the 
probability judgment stated in response to an almanac question actually 
applies to the event “The answer I chose is correct.” 
In the 196Os, Lawrence Phillips (personal communication, August 7, 
1987) was studying probabilistic judgment in the United States. He no- 
ticed that foreign student subjects from Asia seemed to report judgments 
characteristically different from those of others. Some years later, Phillips 
had the opportunity to pursue the issue. In collaboration with George 
Wright at Brunel University in England, Phillips was able to document 
differences of the sort he suspected. In a fascinating series of studies, 
Phillips and Wright consistently found that southeast Asians’ almanac 
question judgments were even more strongly positively biased than were 
British subjects’ assessments (Phillips 8z Wright, 1977; Wright & Phillips, 
1980; Wright, Phillips, Whalley, Choo, Ng, Tan, & Wisudha, 1978). The 
effect was found whether questions were posed in English or in subjects’ 
native languages. Moreover, it was observed for managerial and clerical 
workers as well as for students. 
STUDY 1 
Study 1 sought to determine if the East vs West differences found by 
Wright and Phillips would generalize in a comparison of judgments made 
by subjects in China and the United States. One reason for doubt about 
the generalization is that in some judgment situations Americans and 
Europeans have been found to differ in their confidence. Svenson (1981), 
for example, asked Swedish and American car drivers to compare their 
personal driving skills to those of their fellow drivers in the same room. 
Sixty-nine percent (69%) of the Swedish drivers felt that they were more 
skillful than the median driver. Remarkably, 93% of the American drivers 
considered themselves to have better than average skills. A comparison 
of Chinese and American judgments is also of interest because there are 
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significant differences between the cultures and social systems of China 
and the societies of the Asian groups that participated in the Wright and 
Phillips studies, e.g., Malays, Indonesians, Malaysian Indians, and Hong 
Kong Chinese. It is easy to offer reasons why some of those societal 
distinctions might lead to differences in almanac question probability 
judgments. 
Unfortunately, studies contrasting the accuracy of probability judg- 
ments made by British and Asian subjects have limited their attention to 
calibration. Accordingly, we know nothing about how such judgments 
compare in terms of overall accuracy or other important accuracy dimen- 
sions besides calibration. The present study of Chinese and American 
general-knowledge probability judgment accuracy was designed to eval- 
uate overall accuracy as well as several components of such accuracy, 
including but not limited to calibration. 
Method 
Subjects 
The Chinese subjects in the study included 62 persons. They were 
mainly psychology students at Peking University and the Institute for 
Psychology in Beijing. A few, however, were faculty members in the 
Peking University Psychology Department. The subjects participated in 
the study as an exercise in a judgment course being taught at the univer- 
sity. 
The group of American subjects included 44 individuals. They were 
students at the University of Michigan. They were recruited from the 
University’s Human Performance Center subject pool and were paid for 
their services. 
Materials 
The American subjects responded to a collection of 51 general- 
knowledge questions. Twenty-nine of the 31 items presented to the Chi- 
nese subjects were selected from the 51 considered by the American 
subjects. These were items the investigators expected would be equally 
difficult for Chinese and American subject populations. An illustrative 
item was, “Potatoes grow best in (a) cool climates or (b) warm climates?” 
Procedure 
The American subjects participated in the study in groups of varying 
sizes. All the items were presented to each subject in a booklet. After 
receiving general instructions, practicing the procedure, and having their 
questions answered, the subjects responded to the items at their own 
pace. On each item, the subject indicated the probability that his or her 
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chosen answer was correct by placing a slash through a probability line. 
Those responses subsequently were rounded to 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 
90%, or 100%. 
All the Chinese subjects took part in a single group session. General 
instructions were given, after which the subjects considered a practice 
item, and then had their procedural questions answered. Each item, trans- 
lated into Chinese, was displayed on an overhead transparency projector. 
Subjects reported their chosen answers and probability judgments on a 
one-page response sheet that, for each item, listed the alternative answers 
(a) and (b), and the six allowable probability judgments, i.e., 50%, 
60%, . . . ) 100%. 
Results and Discussion 
The reported analyses were applied to subjects’ responses to the 29 
items that were presented to both the Chinese subjects and the American 
subjects. The first two columns of Table 1 show the medians of the var- 
ious accuracy measures that were computed for each subject in the Chi- 
nese and American samples. The fourth column shows the significance 
levels of statistical tests applied to those measures. 
Overall Accuracy 
Proportion correct. Let the target event in a judgment task be labeled 
A, e.g., A = “My chosen answer is correct” in an almanac question 
situation. An “outcome index” function d is defined as 
d= 1, if event A occurs 
= 0, if event A does not occur. (1) 
The mean of the outcome index, d, is the proportion of times the target 
event occurs. In the present case, it is simply the proportion of correct 
almanac question answers selected by the subject. 
Table 1 indicates that, although the Chinese subjects were slightly more 
successful than the Americans at selecting the correct alternatives, this 
difference was not statistically reliable. This is important for the remain- 
ing analyses of probability judgments. Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) 
found that the extent of overconfidence manifested in subjects’ general- 
knowledge question probability judgments depended on the difficulty of 
the questions. They assumed that an item’s difficulty is indicated by the 
overall proportion of times the item is answered correctly. Lichtenstein 
and Fischhoff observed that overconfidence is most evident for judg- 
ments concerning hard items. There was evidence that, for easy items, 
i.e., those that many people answer correctly, underconfidence some- 
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ing consideration if the items selected for the present study were ones the 
American subjects found easy, but the Chinese subjects found hard. It is 
unclear that such a confound was not present in some of the original 
studies comparing British and southeast Asian subject groups. 
Probability scores. There are several common procedures for indexing 
probability judgment accuracy (Shapiro, 1977; Winkler & Murphy, 1968; 
Yates, 1981, 1982). However, the most widely used measure is attributed 
to Brier (1950) and, in various forms, is known as the “Brier score,” the 
“quadratic score,” and the “probability score.” This was the measure 
employed in the present study. For agiven judgment occasion, the “prob- 
ability score” (PS) is defined by 
(2) 
in whichf is the person’s probability judgment for target event A. 
The outcome index d can be seen as the probability judgment reported 
by a clairvoyant with perfectly accurate opinions about event A. PS is a 
squared error loss function. It measures the degree of closeness between 
the given individual’s judgments and those of the clairvoyant. PS is 
bounded by 0 and 1. The more accurate the person’s judgments are, the 
smaller PS will be. Normally, we seek a sense of a person’s general skill 
at making probability judgments for event A, not simply the skill demon- 
strated in a single instance. This is provided by the mean of PS over many 
different occasions on which event A might occur, %. The sampling 
distributions for I% and most of the other statistics discussed below have 
not been carefully studied. Accordingly, tests of the reliability of group 
differences with respect to those statistics have been made via nonpara- 
metric procedures (Siegel, 1956). 
Over all items and subjects, ps = .2258 for the Chinese subjects, and 
I% = .2204 for the American subjects. That is, the overall accuracy of 
probability judgments was virtually the same for both subject groups. I% 
was computed for each subject individually, too. Table 1 contains the 
median values of ps for the Chinese and the American subjects. As in- 
dicated in the table, the distributions of ps were indeed not significantly 
different from each other. 
Suppose a person thinks he or she cannot anticipate the target event’s 
occurrence. A reasonable strategy in this situation is to assign the same 
probability to all the possibilities. An individual who follows this strategy 
is called a “uniform judge.” In the present study, a uniform judge would 
select answers at random and report 50% probability judgments that each 
of the chosen alternatives is correct. It can be shown that this approach 
yields ps = .25. Interestingly, it is quite possible to do worse than the 
uniform judge. In fact, an often revealing statistic is the percentage of 
152 YATES ET Al.. 
subjects who achieve a better accuracy level than the uniform judge. 
Table 1 shows that the percentage of subjects surpassing that standard 
was better for the Chinese than for the American sample, but not signif- 
icantly so. 
Accuracy Component Analyses 
Calibration. Calibration has most often been studied with the aid of 
calibration diagrams. ’ Figure la is the calibration diagram summarizing 
the judgments of both the Chinese and the American subjects. Note that 
it includes the responses of all the subjects in each group, those of a 
“megasubject,” as it were. The horizontal axis is defined by the subjects’ 
judgments. The vertical axis is identified with the corresponding relative 
frequencies for the target event, i.e., proportions of correct answers in the 
present study. The number adjacent to each point indicates the percent- 
age of cases represented by that point. The points are constructed such 
that the area of each is proportional to the given percentage. The open 
points are for the Chinese subjects’ judgments, the filled points for the 
Americans’ assessments. Thus, for instance, the top point on the lower 
calibration curve indicates that 47.7% of the Chinese subjects’ judgments 
were for 100% certainty, and that approximately 83% of their answers to 
the relevant questions were in fact correct. 
Two types of calibration can be distinguished (Yates, 1982, 1984). The 
kind most easily recognized in a calibration diagram refers to the match of 
individual judgment categories to the corresponding mean outcome in- 
dexes, e.g., the closeness to 60% of the proportion of correct answers for 
which the person indicated 60% certainty, and so forth. This variety of 
calibration is called “calibration-in-the-small.” If a person’s probability 
judgments were perfectly calibrated-in-the-small, the calibration curve for 
those assessments would lie along the 1:l diagonal of the calibration 
diagram. In terms of calibration-in-the-small, overconfidence in answers 
to general-knowledge questions is best evidenced by a calibration curve 
that lies to the right of the I:1 diagonal. Figure la indicates that both the 
Chinese and the American subjects’ judgments were overconfident over 
most of the probability range. It also suggests that the Chinese subjects’ 
overconfidence was somewhat stronger than that of the American sub- 
jects. 
Calibration-in-the-small is measured by the calibration-in-the-small in- 
dex (CIS): 
’ In meteorology, calibration is known as “reliability.” Because the latter term already 
has a special meaning in psychology, the term “calibration” is used here. 
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CIS = (l/N) i Nj 6 - dj)*. (3) 
In Eq. 3, j indexes the various probability judgments the person could 
report, e.g., fi = Xl%, fi = 60%, etc., in the present study. Nj is the 
number of times the judgment 4 was offered, e.g., N3 = 143 = 
(.080)(1775) corresponding to& = .70, as indicated for the Chinese sub- 
jects in Fig. la,Of course, the total number of judgments is simply 
N = Xf= ,Nj . _dj is the mean outcome index for the given judgment 
category, e.g., d3 = 545 for the Chinese subjects in the current illustra- 
tion. The formula makes it apparent that the smaller the CIS, the better 
the calibration-in-the small. As shown in Fig. la, CIS was larger for the 
Chinese subjects than for the American subjects, indicating that the judg- 
ments of the latter were better calibrated. Table 1 shows that the differ- 
ence in the distributions of CIS values for the individual subjects in the 
two groups approached statistical significance. 
An alternative view of judgment accuracy is afforded by covariance 
graphs (Yates & Curley, 1985). Figures 2a and 2b are the covariance 
graphs for the judgments made by the Chinese and the American subjects. 
The outcome index defines the horizontal axis of each graph. For conve- 
nience, the events identified with the alternative values of the outcome 
index are indicated, too, i.e., answers being either “Correct” (d = 1) or 
“Incorrect” (d = 0). The number in parentheses adjacent to each value 
of the outcome index indicates how often the corresponding event actu- 
ally happened. For instance, in Fig. 2a it is shown that the Chinese sub- 
jects selected the correct alternative 1,208 times, but were wrong on 567 
occasions. The vertical axis of each graph describes the various proba- 
bility judgments reported by the subjects. 
The distributions shown in Fig. 2 are, in effect, proportion histograms; 
the sum of the proportions represented in the left- and right-hand histo- 
grams taken together in each graph is 100%. The percentage represented 
by the longest bar in each histogram indicates the scale. Consider, for 
example, the histogram on the right-hand side in the Chinese subjects’ 
covariance graph. There it is shown that 39.4% of the total of 1,775 
judgments made by those individuals were reports of 100% certainty in 
the correctness of answers that were indeed correct. On the “Incorrect” 
side of the graph it is indicated that 9.6% of the subjects’ judgments were 
indications of 50% certainty when the selected answers were in fact 
wrong. 
“Calibration-in-the-large” is the second type of calibration implied in 
the previous discussion. If calibration were as good as possible, then over 
all occasions, the average probability judgment @ would be the same as 







L r lx(O) USA(O) FS: .2258 .2204 
t Var as: M3: N (d): .0289 05.2174 17 5 .2169 0 26411276 
14.3% 
19.3% 
I I I I I I 
.5 .6 .7 .a .9 1.0 
PROBABILITY JUDGMENT ( f j ) 
FIG. 1. Calibration diagrams for general-knowledge question probability judgments made 
by the Chinese (PRC), American (USA), and Japanese (JPN) subjects. The statistics listed 
are defined in the text. The number adjacent to each point is the percentage of occasions on 
which subjects used the given judgment category. 
the proportion of times the target event actually occurs (3. Calibration- 
in-the-large is normally indexed by the “bias” statistic, 
Bias = f - 2, 
or its square, the “calibration-in-the-large” index (CIL): 
(4) 
CIL = Bias*. (5) 
The larger the absolute value of the bias is, the worse is the calibration- 
in-the-large. 
In the context of general-knowledge questions, calibration-in-the-large 
is a better indicator of overconfidence than is calibration-in-the-small. In 
fact, in such situations the bias is sometimes called the “over/ 
underconfidence” statistic (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977). A person’s 
judgments are overconfident to the extent that the bias is positive and 
large. Bias is indicated in a covariance graph by the intersection of hor- 
izontal and vertical dotted lines. The horizontal line passes through the 
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FIG. 2. Covariance graphs for general-knowledge question probability judgments made 
by the (a) Chinese (PRC), (b) American (USA), and (c) Japanese (JPN) subjects. The 
statistics listed are defined in the text. The percentage adjacent to each long bar is the 
percentage of occasions on which subjects reported the given judgment and were either 
correct or incorrect in their choice of answer. 
mean probability judgment fi. The vertical lines goes through the mean 
outcome index or “base rate” (a, which is also the proportion correct in 
the present study. The bias is positive if the intersection is above the 1: 1 
diagonal, negative if below, and nil if it lies right on the diagonal. 
Figures 2a and 2b show that the biases of both the Chinese and the 
American subjects were positive. However, the bias of the former group 
was almost twice as large as that of the latter, indicating much greater 
overconfidence. The comparison of biases for individual subjects in the 
two groups was statistically significant, as indicated in Table 1. Median 
values and tests of CIL are shown in Table 1, too. On an individual 
subject basis, bias and CIL are redundant. This is not the case overall, 
however. For example, suppose half the subjects in a group had a bias of 
+ .15 and half a bias of - .15. The average bias would be 0. But clearly the 
individual subjects’ judgments would be poorly calibrated-in-the-large. 
Discrimination. Calibration entails the ability to properly indicate de- 
grees of certainty. In contrast, discrimination refers to the judge’s ten- 
dency to say something di$hvzr- in any way, numerically or other- 
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wise-on those occasions when the target event is going to happen than 
on those when it is not. A person’s probability judgments are discrimi- 
native or “resolved” to the extent that there is any contingency between 
those judgments and the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the target event. 
It is irrelevant what the character of that contingency is, e.g., whether 
high probability judgments are associated with the event’s occurrence, 
and low ones are not. 
The extent to which a collection of judgments approaches the ideal of 
perfect resolution is perhaps most cleanly represented by the “Murphy 
resolution” (MR) statistic: 
MR = (l/N) h Nj (;j - a2. (6) 
j=l 
MR increases with the degree to which judgments are well-resolved (cf. 
Murphy, 1972a, 1972b; Sanders, 1%3; Yates, 1982, 1984). 
The legitimacy of MR as an index of discrimination is suggested by this 
argument: Suppose there is indeed a contingency between an individual’s 
judgments and the target event A. Then P(Ab) will tend to differ from 
P(AINot&). That is, the “true” probability of the target event will differ 
according to whether the person does or does not offer any particular 
judgment&, e.g., 30%, 80%, etc. And the stronger is the contingency, the 
greater will be the difference P(AK) - P(AINot 4). Now, if the contin- 
gency in question does exist, it will also be the case that P(A&) # P(A). 
In other words, the probability of the target event, conditional on the 
selection of any given judgment category, will differ from the marginal 
probability of the target event. Moreover, the strength of the contingency 
will correspond to the magnitude of the difference P(Ab) - P(A). In the 
notation of Eq. 6, ~j is an estimate of P(Ah), while 2 approximates P(A). 
The appropriateness of MR as a discrimination measure follows. 
Resolution reveals itself in a calibration diagram through the vertical 
coordinates of the points. Resolution is good to the extent that the points 
are far away from the overall relative frequency of the target event, 2. In 
Fig. la, the overall proportions of correct answers by the Chinese and 
American subjects are identified by the horizontal dotted and solid lines, 
respectively. As is perhaps consistent with the visual impression con- 
veyed by the arrays of points, the figure also indicates that MR was higher 
for the Chinese than for the American subjects’ judgments, implying bet- 
ter resolution for the Chinese. As indicated in Table 1, the distribution 
comparison of MR values for individual subjects in the two groups was 
statistically reliable. 
If a person’s probability judgments for event A have good accuracy, 
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then judgments reported when event A occurs generally should be larger 
than those offered when event A does not occur. In covariance graphs, 
the mean of the former judgments is denoted by?,, the mean of the latter 
by&. The “slope” statistic is then defined by 
Slope = TI - &. (7) 
This measure is literally the slope of the regression line for probability 
judgments regressed on outcome indexes, and passes through the points 
(0, fo) and (1, fI). The slope is another reflection of a person’s ability to 
discriminate occasions when the target event will and will not happen. 
Figures 2a and 2b show that, over all judgments, the slope for the 
Chinese subjects was better than that for the American subjects. As in- 
dicated in Table 1, the difference in typical individual-subject slopes was 
reliable. Thus, the Chinese subjects once again demonstrated better skill 
at discriminating when their chosen answers to general-knowledge ques- 
tions were correct rather than incorrect. 
Noisiness. The final aspect of judgment accuracy we discuss refers to 
the “noisiness” of the person’s judgments. Assessments are noisy to the 
degree that they vary in ways that are independent of the occurrence or 
nonoccurrence of the target event. This can happen for at least two rea- 
sons. One source of noise is the inherent inconsistency of the judge. 
Noise will also occur even if the judge is perfectly consistent, but relies on 
cues that are themselves only weakly associated with the target event. 
Judgment noisiness is best appreciated in covariance graphs. Specifi- 
tally, it is implicated in a special form of judgment variability. The dis- 
persion of a person’s probability judgments about the respective condi- 
tional means ft and f0 is useless, as far as anticipating the target event is 
concerned; it is analogous to error variance in the analysis of variance. 
The amount of random variation, or “scatter,” in a collection of judg- 
ments is indexed by the variances of those judgments about the condi- 
tional means, VarV;) when the target event occurs, and Vat+(&) when it 
does not. An overall measure of such variability is provided by the 
“Scat(f)” statistic, which is a weighted mean of the conditional vari- 
ances: 
Scat(f) = [N,Var(f,) + ZV,,Varf&)ll[N, + NoI, (8) 
where N, is the number of occasions on which the target event occurs, No 
the number of instances when it does not. 
Figures 2a and 2b show that the overall random variability in the judg- 
ments of the Chinese subjects was greater than that in the American 
subjects’ judgments. Table 1 indicates that the difference in Scat(/) values 
for individual subjects in the two groups was statistically significant. 
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Tradeofi among accuracy components. The various accuracy dimen- 
sions we have described all contribute to overall accuracy. In fact, they 
compensate for one another. The results indicate that, in terms of overall 
accuracy, the Chinese and American subjects’ probability judgments 
were equivalent. Nevertheless, on some accuracy dimensions the Chi- 
nese judgments were stronger. It was thus necessarily the case that, as we 
indeed observed, the American subjects’ assessments were stronger with 
respect to other aspects of judgment quality. 
The implied tradeoffs are made precise in various decompositions of 
I??. The decomposition due to Murphy (1973) shows how calibration and 
resolution contribute to overall probability judgment accuracy: 
I?!&$ = Var(d) - MR + CIS. (9) 
In this equation, Var(d) = z(l - a is the variance of the outcome index. 
The roles of bias, slope, and noisiness in determining overall judgment 
accuracy are clarified in the following “covariance decomposition” of the 
mean probability score (Yates, 1982): 
m(f,d) = Var(d) + MinVar(/‘) + Scat(f) + Bias* - 2(Slope)(Var(d)). 
w 
The only new statistic indicated in Eq. 10 is MinVarV) = 
(Slope)*(Va@). Conditional upon achieving a given slope, MinVar(f) is 
the total variance that would be present in the person’s judgments, even 
if those judgments contained no random variability. 
STUDY 2 
Japan has notable similarities to as well as differences from both China 
and the United States. On the one hand, Japan shares certain cultural and 
historical traditions with China, e.g., aspects of written language, expo- 
sure to common philosophical and religious ideas, and commercial ties 
spanning hundreds of years. On the other hand, in terms of current broad- 
based technological development and participation in international eco- 
nomic activity, Japan is more like the United States. Thus, it was not 
immediately obvious whether probability judgments made by Japanese 
subjects should be more similar to those of Chinese or American subjects. 
Study 2 was undertaken with a view toward characterizing the accuracy 
of Japanese probability judgments. 
Subjects 
Method 
Ninety-two students at Hokkaido University served as subjects. They 
provided their responses as a course requirement. 
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Materials and Procedure 
The subjects were presented with 75 general-knowledge questions. 
Forty-nine of these items were drawn from a pool used in calibration 
studies conducted in Britain and the United States. Similar to what was 
done in Study 1, these items were expected to be equally familiar to 
Japanese and Western populations. The remaining 26 items were con- 
structed anew, and involved content of special interest in Japan. An ex- 
ample was the item, “Which prefecture has a larger population, (a) Kana- 
gawa, or (b) Aichi?” The procedure was essentially the same as that used 
in Study 1, with the exception that the subject indicated his or her 
5%100% probability judgment in a blank rather than by placing a slash 
through a scale or by circling one of several prescribed possibilities. For 
analytical purposes, each of these responses was rounded to the percent- 
age nearest 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, %, or 100%. 
Results and Discussion 
The calibration diagrams in Fig. lb and lc display the calibration curve 
for the Japanese subjects’ judgments. That curve is shown alongside 
those for the Chinese and the American subjects, respectively, to facili- 
tate comparisons. Figure 2c shows the Japanese subjects’ covariance 
mph. 
As indicated above, the sampling distributions of various accuracy 
component statistics are not well understood. However, Sarah Lichten- 
stein (personal communication, October 1987) has observed that both CIS 
and MR seem to decrease systematically as the number of judgments 
made by the subject increases. Accordingly, we sought to equate the 
effective numbers of items considered by subjects in all three groups 
before making comparisons. Disjoint samples of 29 items were randomly 
sampled from the entire set of 75 seen by the Japanese subjects. One pair 
of these samples, i.e., 58 items total, was selected to be representative of 
the entire item pool with respect to difficulty. Specifically, samples were 
chosen whose mean proportions correct were not statistically different 
from each other, from the overall Japanese item pool mean, or from the 
means of the Chinese and American subjects’ judgments. Accuracy sta- 
tistics were then computed for each subject on each of the 29-item sub- 
sets. The average of the two resulting statistics was taken as the pertinent 
measure for that subject. For instance, a given subject’s CIS measure was 
the average of CIS computed for that person on each of the two 29-item 
subsets. The medians of various statistics computed for individual Japa- 
nese subjects, as well as comparisons to those of Chinese and American 
subjects, are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 indicates that there were no statistically reliable differences 
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between the Japanese and American subjects in terms of overall accuracy 
or any accuracy component. Also, on the whole, the differences between 
the Japanese subjects’ judgments and those of the Chinese subjects par- 
alleled the previously observed Chinese vs American differences. The 
one noteworthy exception was that, whereas the resolution measure MR 
was significantly better for the Chinese than for the American subjects, 
the corresponding comparison between the Chinese and Japanese sub- 
jects was not significant. 
STUDY 3 
There are many situations in which probability judgments about quan- 
tities rather than about inherently discrete events are useful. For instance, 
agricultural officials have a need to know how much rain will fall during 
a given time period. Production managers need to anticipate what the 
prices of various supplies will be. Study 3 addressed the accuracy of such 
judgments. 
Probability judgments about quantities are commonly conceptualized in 
terms of “judged probability distributions.” These distributions are typ- 
ically characterized by their fractiles and the implied credible intervals. A 
popular procedure for eliciting such distributions is the “fractile 
method.” In this technique, the subject reports several fractiles for the 
given quantity. In the present application, fractiles associated with the 
following seven probabilities were requested for each quantity: .Ol, . 10, 
.25, 50, .75, 90, and 99. As a concrete illustration, the following ques- 
tion was used to obtain the American subjects’ .Ol fractiles for the aver- 
age U.S. lifespan: “What number of years is such that there is a 1% 
chance that the actual average lifespan in the U.S. is that number of years 
or fewer?” 
More generally, suppose that Q is the quantity of interest. The fractile 
associated with probability p is denoted qP, and is interpreted to mean 
that, in the given individual’s opinion, P’(Q 6 qJ = p, where P’ indicates 
a probability judgment. For instance, if a weather forecaster believes 
there is a 10% chance that there will be no more than 1.5 cm of rain during 
a certain period, this would imply that q.lo = 1.5. A “credible interval” 
is a range of potential values for a quantity, along with an indication of the 
chance that the actual value of the quantity will be contained in that 
interval. For example, the .lO and .50 fractiles define a 40% credible 
interval, (q.lo, q.501.2 That is, P’(q.,, < Q G q.50) = .40; the person feels 
that there is a 40% probability that the actual value of the quantity will fall 
within the interval. 
’ In this notation, a parenthesis means that the interval excludes the associated endpoint, 
while a bracket implies that the interval includes the endpoint. 
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An individual’s probability judgments about quantities exhibit perfect 
“distribution calibration” if all of his or her credible intervals are per- 
fectly calibrated in the previous sense of the term. That is, for any prob- 
ability X%, the actual values assumed by various quantities fall within 
exactly X% of that individual’s X% credible intervals. Suppose a weather 
forecaster reported judged probability distributions for the amount of 
rainfall on 1,000 different occasions. For each of those distributions a 40% 
credible interval could be identified. If the forecaster’s judgments have 
perfect distribution calibration, then the actual amounts of observed rain- 
fall will lie within the specified intervals in 400 of those cases; they will be 
outside those intervals in the remaining 600. 
Suppose that p is a small probability, e.g., 1%. The observation of an 
actual quantity value smaller than qP or larger than q1 -P is referred to as 
a “surprise” (cf. Alpert & Raiffa, 1982). For example, if the actual 
amount of rain that falls in an area is smaller than q.ol or larger than q,% 
in a forecaster’s judged probability distribution, then we would say that a 
“2% surprise” has occurred. The terminology is appropriate; the fore- 
caster indeed should be surprised upon observing an amount of rain in 
what he or she thought was a highly improbable range of values. Over 
many occasions, the number or proportion of surprises is called the “sur- 
prise index.” 
A special type of distribution miscalibration is commonly interpreted as 
overconfidence. A person’s opinions are said to be overconfident if the 
surprise indexes for extreme credible intervals in his or her judged prob- 
ability distributions are larger than they would be under perfect calibra- 
tion. This implies that those distributions are too narrow. Such a distri- 
bution indicates that the person is overly certain that the actual magnitude 
of the given quantity will fall close to some specific value, e.g., the me- 
dian of the distribution. 
Judged probability distributions of professionals, e.g., meterologists 
(Murphy (42 Winkler, 1974) and accountants (Tomassini, Solomon, Rom- 
ney, & Krogstad, 1982), have been found to be slightly overconfident. 
The overconfidence of distribution judgments by laypersons is often 
marked. For example, Alpert and Raiffa (1982) had students make prob- 
ability distribution judgments concerning various quantities about which 
the average person could be expected to have reasonable awareness, e.g., 
the number of students enrolled in a local doctoral program. The 2% 
surprise index for the students’ judgments was an enormous 42.6%. 
The main purpose of Study 3 was to test whether the calibration dif- 
ference between Chinese and American subjects’ probability judgments 
for discrete events observed in Study 1 would generalize to distribution 
judgments. Wright and Wisudha (1982) reported results suggesting that 
the typically observed difference in the calibration of British and Asian 
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subjects’ general-knowledge question probability judgments does not ex- 
tend to opinions about events that might happen in the future, e.g., that 
“ ‘At least one national leader (president or prime minister, etc.) (a) will 
(b) will not die during the next 30 days’ ” (p. 221). So a secondary aim of 
the present study was to determine if such a similar interaction of subject 
group and temporal focus, i.e., past vs future, would characterize distri- 
bution judgment calibration. 
Method 
Subjects 
The Chinese subjects who participated in the study were 60 students at 
Peking University. They were compensated for their services. The 54 
American subjects were students in a psychology course at the University 
of Michigan. They took part in the study as part of a course project. 
Materials 
Each group of subjects made judgments about 20 different quantities. 
Half the items concerned quantities whose values existed at the time the 
subjects responded to the items, e.g., the length of the Yangtze River, for 
the Chinese subjects. The remaining items were about quantities that 
would only exist in the future, e.g., the minimum temperature recorded in 
Guangzhou a few days hence. 
The item pools seen by the two groups of subjects were constructed to 
be parallel to each other. Some target quantities were identical for both 
groups, e.g., the area of Australia. Other items were designed to be dif- 
ferent, but comparable. For instance, instead of being asked about the 
minimum temperature recorded in Guangzhou, the American subjects 
were requested to forecast the high temperature in Miami. 
Procedure 
The Chinese subjects participated in group sessions. The procedure 
was explained and practiced, after which the subjects’ questions were 
answered. The items were presented one at a time. As indicated above, 
subjects’ judgments were elicited via the fractile method.3 They reported 
the fractiles of their judged probability distributions on individual re- 
sponse sheets. 
3 It is known that overconfidence is more strongly evidenced in judgments obtained 
through the fi-actile method than by other procedures (e.g., Seaver, von Winterfeldt, & 
Edwards, 1978). The technique was used here nevertheless because it lends itself to judg- 
ments for quantities on different scales and because the primary concern was with relative 
rather than absolute amounts of overconfidence. 
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FIG. 3. Proportions of actual quantity values falling within credible intervals of Chinese 
(PRC) and American (USA) subjects’ judged probability distributions. 
The items considered by the American subjects were presented to them 
in a booklet. The procedure was explained and practiced in a large group 
session. The subjects were then allowed to respond to all the items in the 
booklet at home, returning the completed booklets at the next class meet- 
ing. The subjects were asked to perform the task alone and without con- 
sulting any other source. 
Results and Discussion 
Figure 3 shows the proportions of actual quantity values, over all items, 
falling within the various consecutive credible intervals defined by the 
fractiles reported by the Chinese and American subjects. These propor- 
tions are indicated by the second and third histograms. The first histo- 
gram shows what the observed proportions would have been if distribu- 
tion calibration had been perfect. 
As Fig. 3 indicates, the distribution judgments of both subject groups 
yielded 2% surprise indexes that were much too high, implying marked 
overconfidence. Tests of individual surprise indexes against their expec- 
tations according to perfect calibration were highly significant statistically 
for both the Chinese and the American subjects (~(59) = 35.08, p < .OOOl , 
for the Chinese subjects; t(53) = 21.75, p < .OOOl, for the American 
subjects).4 The fact that, in each instance, most surprises were in the (q.*, 
4 To accommodate potential variance stability problems, tests were performed on surprise 
indexes (P) transformed as follows: arcsin(P”2). 
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UB] rather than the [LB, q.ol] intervals (“UB” stands for “upper 
bound,” “ LB” for “lower bound”) implies that the subjects tended to 
underestimate the various quantities. Nevertheless, for both subject 
groups, the surprises in the [LB, q..,J intervals were far more numerous 
than perfect calibration would allow (t(59) = 6.31, p < .OOOl, for the 
Chinese subjects; t(53) = 5.13, p < .OOOl, for the American subjects). 
Thus, subjects’ overconfidence was not simply a result of their underes- 
timating the quantities. Consistent with what has been found for judg- 
ments concerning discrete events, the surprise indexes for the Chinese 
subjects were higher than those for the American subjects (t(l12) = 2.65, 
p < .Ol). 
Figure 4a illustrates the calibration comparison of current vs future 
judgments made by the Chinese subjects. Figure 4b does the same for the 
American subjects’ responses. As the graphs and surprise indexes indi- 
cate, both groups exhibited less overconfidence in their judgments about 
future rather than current quantities (t(59) = 2.36, p < .03, for the Chi- 
nese subjects; t(53) = 3.74, p c .OOl, for the American subjects). These 
results are consistent with the main effect of temporal focus observed by 
Wright and Wisudha (1982) in the context of discrete event judgments. 
However, contrary to the interaction hypothesis suggested by their find- 
ings, there was no evidence that, for future quantities, the distribution 
calibration of the Chinese subjects was better than that of the American 
subjects. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Major conclusions concerning the Chinese vs American comparisons 
are summarized as follows: Previous research has shown that the calibra- 
tion of general-knowledge question probability judgments differs for Brit- 
ish subjects as compared to various groups of Asian subjects. The present 
work revealed a parallel difference between the judgments of American 
and Chinese subjects. Moreover, this discrete-alternative calibration dif- 
ference was found to generalize to probability distribution judgments for 
various quantities. Both groups’ distribution judgments were overconfi- 
dent, and this effect was especially pronounced for the Chinese subjects. 
The most important new finding was that the calibration difference was 
complemented by a discrimination difference. Specifically, the Chinese 
subjects’ judgments about their answers to general-knowledge questions 
were especially good with respect to their ability to distinguish occasions 
when those answers were correct from occasions when they were not. 
It is particularly noteworthy that the overall accuracy levels of the 
Chinese, American, and Japanese subject groups were virtually indistin- 
guishable. This result is all the more arresting because the routes to this 
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and (b) American (USA) subjects’ judged probability distributions for current vs future 
quantities. 
common achievement were so different for the Chinese as compared to 
the Americans and Japanese. On the whole, the judgments of the latter 
two groups were essentially the same in character. 
The challenge of future studies is to discover why the observed differ- 
ences in the various components of probability judgment accuracy occur, 
while overall accuracy remains the same. It is conceivable that the dif- 
ferences reflect mere response biases. That is, in terms of true opinions, 
the distinctions between the national groups might not exist. They only 
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appear to exist because psychologists’ methods accurately assess some 
groups’ actual beliefs but not others’. There are various ways this re- 
sponse bias hypothesis can and should be tested. Assuming that the re- 
sponse bias explanation can be dismissed, more substantive hypotheses 
should be examined. 
Wright and his colleagues (e.g., Wright LIZ Phillips, 1980) suggest that 
British-Asian calibration distinctions reflect fundamental cultural differ- 
ences in how people think about uncertainty. According to this view, 
whereas Westerners tend to think in terms of degrees of certainty, Asians 
are more apt to view things in absolutes. This is an interesting thesis that 
should be thoroughly investigated. The results for the Japanese subjects 
indicate that a simple cultural explanation might be untenable. Instead, 
the differences perhaps rest equally, if not more heavily, on the subjects’ 
current socioeconomic situations. For instance, technologically oriented 
societies, such as those in Britain, Japan, and the United Staes, might 
demand more attention to the kind of precision represented by good cal- 
ibration. 
But why should the Chinese subjects’ judgments have such good dis- 
crimination, e.g., resolution and slope? Once again, a plausible and test- 
able hypothesis is that this is a reflection of the pervading demands of the 
society. Good discrimination is possible only if the person reporting judg- 
ments fundamentally “knows” what is or is not going to happen. It is 
conceivable that the reward structure in Chinese society is more generous 
for outstanding discrimination than it is for proper numerical labeling, 
e.g., calibration. 
Future studies must pursue more than explanations for the specific 
effects observed here. For one thing, discrete event judgments other than 
those concerning general-knowledge questions must be collected and an- 
alyzed: Do the present conclusions apply to judgments about the kinds of 
externally determined future events that underlie important practical de- 
cisions, e.g., the outcomes of medical procedures and changes in business 
conditions? Rightly so, some authors (e.g., Ronis 8z Yates, 1987; Wright 
& Ayton, 1986) have noted that conclusions derived from studies of re- 
sponses to general-knowledge questions might not necessarily apply to 
true forecasting situations.5 There should also be serious study of judg- 
ments by experts. Would results parallel to the present ones be found for 
assessments made by professionals in their areas of practice, e.g., among 
meteorologists, physicians, and economic forecasters? 
’ This does not mean that, if the observed differences do not extend to future-event 
judgments, they are unimportant. The existing data strongly implicate cross-national ditfer- 
ences in metacognition about factual knowledge. These effects are inherently interesting. 
They could also apply to other kinds of knowledge and might have relevance for educa- 
tional practice. See Newman (1984) for discussion of related issues. 
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The practical significance of national differences in probability judg- 
ment accuracy depends in part on the foundations of those distinctions. 
Some implications seem independent of the underpinnings, however. At 
a minimum, the differences suggest that cross-national miscommunica- 
tion about uncertainty is virtually guaranteed. In many Western countries 
there is a growing consensus that discussion about uncertainty would be 
less ambiguous if expression were in the form of probabilities (cf. Beyth- 
Marom, 1982; Bryant & Norman, 1980; Kong, Bamett, Mosteller, & 
Youtz, 1986). The present results imply that this approach alone would 
not necessarily improve international communications. Unless a con- 
certed effort were made to assure a common interpretation of what prob- 
ability judgments should mean with respect to concepts such as calibra- 
tion, probability expression might actually exacerbate misunderstanding. 
Decision analysis often involves applying tools like expected utility 
maximization to important practical problems. Wright et al. (1978) have 
suggested that, because Asians seem to think about uncertainty differ- 
ently than Westerners do, decision analysis might be less useful in Asia 
than in the West. Independently, Pollock and Chen (1986) have also ex- 
pressed pessimism about the suitability of decision analysis in China, for 
reasons that seem similar to those of Wright et al.: “What we found in 
China, . . . , was a decision-making environment that was almost com- 
pletely devoid of a formal concern for uncertainty” (p. 35). Phenomena 
such as probability judgment miscalibration undoubtedly detract from the 
value of decision analysis. However, it might be premature to conclude 
that technologies such as decision analysis are inherently unworkable in 
China because of such effects. One reason is that miscalibration some- 
times can be improved by mere mathematical transformations of individ- 
uals’ judgments. A more important reason is suggested by the good dis- 
crimination evident in the Chinese subjects’ judgments in Study 1. 
In their attempt to apply decision analysis in China, Pollock and Chen 
(1986) appear to have experienced the manifestations as well as the pos- 
sible cause of a Chinese emphasis on discrimination. They noted that the 
prevailing mode of decision making made it “particularly uncomfortable 
for our Chinese colleagues to accept uncertainty” (p. 36). Thus, while 
relatively weak discrimination might be acceptable in Japan and the West, 
it is too costly to be tolerated in China. As implied by Pollock and Chen’s 
remarks, and in previous suggestions here, the good discrimination ex- 
hibited by the Chinese could be simply a matter of current social incen- 
tives. That is, individuals might be motivated to devote more effort to 
achieving good discrimination, possibly at the expense of good calibra- 
tion. In addition, however, a tradition emphasizing discrimination might 
have led to cognitive strategies that permit better discrimination than is 
afforded by the judgment procedures found elsewhere. Future studies 
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should be directed toward determining whether this is the case. If it is, 
then the prospects for techniques like decision analysis in China are bright 
indeed. This is because good discrimination provides a more solid foun- 
dation for accurate judgments than does good calibration. Moreover, the 
judgment procedures which lead to good Chinese discrimination would be 
worthy of imitation by others. 
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